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Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

ice: call ice_is_malicious_vf() from ice_vc_process_vf_msg()

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The main loop in __ice_clean_ctrlq first checks if a VF might be malicious
before calling ice_vc_process_vf_msg(). This results in duplicate code in
both functions to obtain a reference to the VF, and exports the
ice_is_malicious_vf() from ice_virtchnl.c unnecessarily.

Refactor ice_is_malicious_vf() to be a static function that takes a pointer
to the VF. Call this in ice_vc_process_vf_msg() just after we obtain a
reference to the VF by calling ice_get_vf_by_id.

Pass the mailbox data from the __ice_clean_ctrlq function into
ice_vc_process_vf_msg() instead of calling ice_is_malicious_vf().

This reduces the number of exported functions and avoids the need to obtain
the VF reference twice for every mailbox message.

Note that the state check for ICE_VF_STATE_DIS is kept in
ice_is_malicious_vf() and we call this before checking that state in
ice_vc_process_vf_msg. This is intentional, as we stop responding to VF
messages from a VF once we detect that it may be overflowing the mailbox.
This ensures that we continue to silently ignore the message as before
without responding via ice_vc_send_msg_to_vf().

Signed-off-by: Jacob Keller <jacob.e.keller@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Michal Swiatkowski <michal.swiatkowski@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: Marek Szlosek <marek.szlosek@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
This commit is contained in:
Jacob Keller 2023-02-22 09:09:20 -08:00 committed by Tony Nguyen
parent c414463ab1
commit be96815c61
3 changed files with 24 additions and 32 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

3
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_main.c
View File

@ -1517,8 +1517,7 @@ static int __ice_clean_ctrlq(struct ice_pf *pf, enum ice_ctl_q q_type)
data.max_num_msgs_mbx = hw->mailboxq.num_rq_entries;
data.async_watermark_val = ICE_MBX_OVERFLOW_WATERMARK;
if (!ice_is_malicious_vf(pf, &event, &data))
ice_vc_process_vf_msg(pf, &event);
ice_vc_process_vf_msg(pf, &event, &data);
break;
case ice_aqc_opc_fw_logging:
ice_output_fw_log(hw, &event.desc, event.msg_buf);

36
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.c
View File

@ -3834,27 +3834,26 @@ void ice_virtchnl_set_repr_ops(struct ice_vf *vf)
}
/**
* ice_is_malicious_vf - helper function to detect a malicious VF
* @pf: ptr to struct ice_pf
* @event: pointer to the AQ event
* ice_is_malicious_vf - check if this vf might be overflowing mailbox
* @vf: the VF to check
* @mbxdata: data about the state of the mailbox
*
* Detect if a given VF might be malicious and attempting to overflow the PF
* mailbox. If so, log a warning message and ignore this event.
*/
bool
ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
static bool
ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
{
s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval);
struct device *dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf);
bool report_malvf = false;
struct ice_vf *vf;
struct device *dev;
struct ice_pf *pf;
int status;
vf = ice_get_vf_by_id(pf, vf_id);
if (!vf)
return false;
pf = vf->pf;
dev = ice_pf_to_dev(pf);
if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states))
goto out_put_vf;
return vf->mbx_info.malicious;
/* check to see if we have a newly malicious VF */
status = ice_mbx_vf_state_handler(&pf->hw, mbxdata, &vf->mbx_info,
@ -3872,9 +3871,6 @@ ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
pf_vsi ? pf_vsi->netdev->dev_addr : zero_addr);
}
out_put_vf:
ice_put_vf(vf);
return vf->mbx_info.malicious;
}
@ -3882,11 +3878,13 @@ out_put_vf:
* ice_vc_process_vf_msg - Process request from VF
* @pf: pointer to the PF structure
* @event: pointer to the AQ event
* @mbxdata: information used to detect VF attempting mailbox overflow
*
* called from the common asq/arq handler to
* process request from VF
*/
void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event)
void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
{
u32 v_opcode = le32_to_cpu(event->desc.cookie_high);
s16 vf_id = le16_to_cpu(event->desc.retval);
@ -3908,6 +3906,10 @@ void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event)
mutex_lock(&vf->cfg_lock);
/* Check if the VF is trying to overflow the mailbox */
if (ice_is_malicious_vf(vf, mbxdata))
goto finish;
/* Check if VF is disabled. */
if (test_bit(ICE_VF_STATE_DIS, vf->vf_states)) {
err = -EPERM;

17
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ice/ice_virtchnl.h
View File

@ -63,10 +63,8 @@ int
ice_vc_send_msg_to_vf(struct ice_vf *vf, u32 v_opcode,
enum virtchnl_status_code v_retval, u8 *msg, u16 msglen);
bool ice_vc_isvalid_vsi_id(struct ice_vf *vf, u16 vsi_id);
bool
ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata);
void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event);
void ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata);
#else /* CONFIG_PCI_IOV */
static inline void ice_virtchnl_set_dflt_ops(struct ice_vf *vf) { }
static inline void ice_virtchnl_set_repr_ops(struct ice_vf *vf) { }
@ -86,16 +84,9 @@ static inline bool ice_vc_isvalid_vsi_id(struct ice_vf *vf, u16 vsi_id)
return false;
}
static inline bool
ice_is_malicious_vf(struct ice_pf __always_unused *pf,
struct ice_rq_event_info __always_unused *event,
struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
{
return false;
}
static inline void
ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event)
ice_vc_process_vf_msg(struct ice_pf *pf, struct ice_rq_event_info *event,
struct ice_mbx_data *mbxdata)
{
}
#endif /* !CONFIG_PCI_IOV */