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Main-line Linux kernel tree
http://www.kernel.org
c35559f94e
When operating with shadow stacks enabled, the kernel will automatically allocate shadow stacks for new threads, however in some cases userspace will need additional shadow stacks. The main example of this is the ucontext family of functions, which require userspace allocating and pivoting to userspace managed stacks. Unlike most other user memory permissions, shadow stacks need to be provisioned with special data in order to be useful. They need to be setup with a restore token so that userspace can pivot to them via the RSTORSSP instruction. But, the security design of shadow stacks is that they should not be written to except in limited circumstances. This presents a problem for userspace, as to how userspace can provision this special data, without allowing for the shadow stack to be generally writable. Previously, a new PROT_SHADOW_STACK was attempted, which could be mprotect()ed from RW permissions after the data was provisioned. This was found to not be secure enough, as other threads could write to the shadow stack during the writable window. The kernel can use a special instruction, WRUSS, to write directly to userspace shadow stacks. So the solution can be that memory can be mapped as shadow stack permissions from the beginning (never generally writable in userspace), and the kernel itself can write the restore token. First, a new madvise() flag was explored, which could operate on the PROT_SHADOW_STACK memory. This had a couple of downsides: 1. Extra checks were needed in mprotect() to prevent writable memory from ever becoming PROT_SHADOW_STACK. 2. Extra checks/vma state were needed in the new madvise() to prevent restore tokens being written into the middle of pre-used shadow stacks. It is ideal to prevent restore tokens being added at arbitrary locations, so the check was to make sure the shadow stack had never been written to. 3. It stood out from the rest of the madvise flags, as more of direct action than a hint at future desired behavior. So rather than repurpose two existing syscalls (mmap, madvise) that don't quite fit, just implement a new map_shadow_stack syscall to allow userspace to map and setup new shadow stacks in one step. While ucontext is the primary motivator, userspace may have other unforeseen reasons to setup its own shadow stacks using the WRSS instruction. Towards this provide a flag so that stacks can be optionally setup securely for the common case of ucontext without enabling WRSS. Or potentially have the kernel set up the shadow stack in some new way. The following example demonstrates how to create a new shadow stack with map_shadow_stack: void *shstk = map_shadow_stack(addr, stack_size, SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN); Signed-off-by: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Mike Rapoport (IBM) <rppt@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com> Tested-by: John Allen <john.allen@amd.com> Tested-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20230613001108.3040476-35-rick.p.edgecombe%40intel.com |
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| init | ||
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| kernel | ||
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| .clang-format | ||
| .cocciconfig | ||
| .get_maintainer.ignore | ||
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| .gitignore | ||
| .mailmap | ||
| .rustfmt.toml | ||
| COPYING | ||
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| README | ||
Linux kernel
============
There are several guides for kernel developers and users. These guides can
be rendered in a number of formats, like HTML and PDF. Please read
Documentation/admin-guide/README.rst first.
In order to build the documentation, use ``make htmldocs`` or
``make pdfdocs``. The formatted documentation can also be read online at:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/
There are various text files in the Documentation/ subdirectory,
several of them using the Restructured Text markup notation.
Please read the Documentation/process/changes.rst file, as it contains the
requirements for building and running the kernel, and information about
the problems which may result by upgrading your kernel.