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	Using ptrace(2) and related debug features on a target process can lead to a privilege escalation. Indeed, ptrace(2) can be used by an attacker to impersonate another task and to remain undetected while performing malicious activities. Thanks to ptrace_may_access(), various part of the kernel can check if a tracer is more privileged than a tracee. A landlocked process has fewer privileges than a non-landlocked process and must then be subject to additional restrictions when manipulating processes. To be allowed to use ptrace(2) and related syscalls on a target process, a landlocked process must have a subset of the target process's rules (i.e. the tracee must be in a sub-domain of the tracer). Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210422154123.13086-5-mic@digikod.net Signed-off-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
		
			
				
	
	
		
			121 lines
		
	
	
		
			3.1 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			121 lines
		
	
	
		
			3.1 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
| // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
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| /*
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|  * Landlock LSM - Ptrace hooks
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|  *
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|  * Copyright © 2017-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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|  * Copyright © 2019-2020 ANSSI
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|  */
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| 
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| #include <asm/current.h>
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| #include <linux/cred.h>
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| #include <linux/errno.h>
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| #include <linux/kernel.h>
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| #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
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| #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
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| #include <linux/sched.h>
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| 
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| #include "common.h"
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| #include "cred.h"
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| #include "ptrace.h"
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| #include "ruleset.h"
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| #include "setup.h"
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| 
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| /**
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|  * domain_scope_le - Checks domain ordering for scoped ptrace
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|  *
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|  * @parent: Parent domain.
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|  * @child: Potential child of @parent.
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|  *
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|  * Checks if the @parent domain is less or equal to (i.e. an ancestor, which
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|  * means a subset of) the @child domain.
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|  */
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| static bool domain_scope_le(const struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
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| 		const struct landlock_ruleset *const child)
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| {
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| 	const struct landlock_hierarchy *walker;
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| 
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| 	if (!parent)
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| 		return true;
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| 	if (!child)
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| 		return false;
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| 	for (walker = child->hierarchy; walker; walker = walker->parent) {
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| 		if (walker == parent->hierarchy)
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| 			/* @parent is in the scoped hierarchy of @child. */
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| 			return true;
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| 	}
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| 	/* There is no relationship between @parent and @child. */
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| 	return false;
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| }
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| 
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| static bool task_is_scoped(const struct task_struct *const parent,
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| 		const struct task_struct *const child)
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| {
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| 	bool is_scoped;
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| 	const struct landlock_ruleset *dom_parent, *dom_child;
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| 
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| 	rcu_read_lock();
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| 	dom_parent = landlock_get_task_domain(parent);
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| 	dom_child = landlock_get_task_domain(child);
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| 	is_scoped = domain_scope_le(dom_parent, dom_child);
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| 	rcu_read_unlock();
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| 	return is_scoped;
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| }
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| 
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| static int task_ptrace(const struct task_struct *const parent,
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| 		const struct task_struct *const child)
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| {
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| 	/* Quick return for non-landlocked tasks. */
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| 	if (!landlocked(parent))
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| 		return 0;
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| 	if (task_is_scoped(parent, child))
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| 		return 0;
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| 	return -EPERM;
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| }
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| 
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| /**
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|  * hook_ptrace_access_check - Determines whether the current process may access
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|  *			      another
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|  *
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|  * @child: Process to be accessed.
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|  * @mode: Mode of attachment.
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|  *
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|  * If the current task has Landlock rules, then the child must have at least
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|  * the same rules.  Else denied.
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|  *
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|  * Determines whether a process may access another, returning 0 if permission
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|  * granted, -errno if denied.
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|  */
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| static int hook_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *const child,
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| 		const unsigned int mode)
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| {
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| 	return task_ptrace(current, child);
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| }
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| 
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| /**
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|  * hook_ptrace_traceme - Determines whether another process may trace the
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|  *			 current one
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|  *
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|  * @parent: Task proposed to be the tracer.
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|  *
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|  * If the parent has Landlock rules, then the current task must have the same
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|  * or more rules.  Else denied.
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|  *
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|  * Determines whether the nominated task is permitted to trace the current
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|  * process, returning 0 if permission is granted, -errno if denied.
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|  */
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| static int hook_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *const parent)
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| {
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| 	return task_ptrace(parent, current);
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| }
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| 
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| static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
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| 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, hook_ptrace_access_check),
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| 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, hook_ptrace_traceme),
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| };
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| 
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| __init void landlock_add_ptrace_hooks(void)
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| {
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| 	security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
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| 			LANDLOCK_NAME);
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| }
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